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Abstract   As with all other moral realists, so-called relaxed moral realists believe that there are 
moral truths. Unlike metaphysical moral realists, they do not take themselves to be defending a 
substantively metaphysical position when espousing this view, but to be putting forward a moral 
thesis from within moral discourse. In this paper, I employ minimalism about truth to examine 
whether or not there is a semantic analysis of the claim ‘There are moral truths’ which can support 
this moral interpretation of one of moral realism’s key theses. My results are both discouraging 
and encouraging: Whilst I will argue that the claim ‘There are moral truths’ cannot be shown to 
be both moral and capable of demarcating relaxed realism from irrealism on the basis of a con-
vincing semantic analysis that would be compatible with relaxed commitments, the moral inter-
pretation of moral realism can be secured by modifying our understanding of what distinguishes 
relaxed realism from error-theoretic irrealism. Yet, we will see that this moral interpretation of 
moral realism does not ‘tumble out’ of the semantics provided for its central claims. Rather, hard 
work needs to be done before we can fully relax. 
Keywords  Relaxed moral realism  Minimalism  Semantics  Metaethics  Metaphysical moral 
realism 
1 Introduction 
As with all other moral realists, non-metaphysical moral realists—or ‘relaxed’ realists, as 
I will call them—submit that there are objective moral truths. In this vein, Scanlon (2014: 
16) defends “the idea that that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for 
action”, Dworkin (2011: 7) believes “that there are objective truths about value”, Nagel 
(1986: 144) rejects arguments to the effect that “there are no irreducibly normative 
truths”, Parfit (2011: 559) defends the view that “there are some irreducibly normative 
reason-involving truths” and Blackburn (1998: 319) replies “No, no, no” to the charge 
that his position on moral truths implies that “there aren’t any really”. 
Unlike metaphysical moral realists, relaxed realists do not take themselves to be de-
fending robustly metaphysical positions when espousing these views. Instead, they be-
lieve that they are putting forward normative or moral theses from within normative and 
moral discourse respectively. As such, Scanlon (2014: 20) argues that “the truth values of 
statements in [the normative domain], including existential statements, are properly set-
tled by standards internal to that domain”, while Blackburn (1998: 311) explains that the 
claim ‘Moral truths are mind-independent’ “can only [involve giving] a moral verdict on 
[a particular] situation”; to Nagel (1986: 144), the “claim that certain reasons exist is a 
normative claim”, whereas Dworkin (2011: 10) explicates that theories of moral 
knowledge and truth “are drawn from within morality—they are themselves moral judg-
ments”; Kramer (2009: 1) states on the very first page of his book that “[m]oral realism 
… is a moral doctrine” and even Bart Streumer (2017: 127), himself an error theorist, is 
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“inclined to agree … that the sentence ‘[Normative] Realism is true’ expresses a norma-
tive judgement …”. 
In a nutshell, then, relaxed moral realists submit that there are moral truths and that 
these truths are objective, whilst being committed to the moral, discourse-internal inter-
pretation of these theses.1 Surprisingly, though, whilst quite a bit has been written on the 
moral interpretation of morality’s objectivity,2 next to nothing has been said about a se-
mantics of the more general thesis  
(T)  There are moral truths 
that would show (T) to be a discourse-internal, moral claim.3 
There are two reasons why it is crucial for relaxed realists to make amends for this 
omission. The first is obvious: If (T) encapsulated one of moral realism’s core theses, but 
there were no semantic analysis of (T) available according to which (T) would qualify as 
moral, relaxed realism would be a non-starter. The second uses the same thought to re-
laxed realists’ advantage, stating that if (T) formed one central thesis of moral realism and 
(T)’s semantic analysis did classify (T) as moral, relaxed realists could pile up the pressure 
on metaphysical moral realists by urging them to explicate in which way their defence of 
this moral claim (T) could possibly amount to presenting a metaphysical position.4 
                                                             
1 Relaxed moral realism as defined here thus includes the positions of Thomas Nagel (1986), 
Tim Scanlon (2014, 2017) and Derek Parfit (2011), the quasi-realism of Simon Blackburn (1998), 
Allan Gibbard (2003) and Huw Price (2013), together with anti-Archimedeanism as defended by 
Matthew Kramer (2009) and Ronald Dworkin (1996, 2011). Any disagreement that holds 
amongst these philosophers can be ignored for the purposes of this paper. For metaphysically 
substantive moral realism, see Enoch (2011), Brink (1989) and Shafer-Landau (2003). 
Since I will focus exclusively on moral claims and moral discourse, in what follows I will use 
the terms ‘discourse-internal’ and ‘moral’ interchangeably. Importantly, this is not to deny that 
we find different kinds of claims within moral discourse, with some being more abstract and 
others being more concrete. See Kramer (2009: 11) for more on this point.  
2 Here, I think of moral objectivity in terms of mind-independence (see Blackburn 1998: 311, 
Kramer 2009: ch. 2 and Dworkin 1996). Given these prior studies about the moral reading of 
mind-independence, in this paper I will focus exclusively on the thesis that there are moral truths, 
rather than the thesis that there are mind-independent moral truths. As such, I am primarily 
interested in moral realism’s opposition to error-theoretic irrealism, which rejects the existence 
of moral truths, rather than its opposition to versions of constructivism, which accept the exist-
ence of moral truths but deny that these are mind-independent. My project can thus also be 
understood as asking in which way anyone who endorses the existence of moral truths—includ-
ing realists and constructivists—can be understood as putting forward a discourse-internal view, 
irrespective of whether they conceive of these truths as mind-dependent or mind-independent. 
Showing that views on mind-independence are also discourse-internal is thus an additional pro-
ject as pursued by, for instance, Blackburn, Dworkin and Kramer.   
3 Simon Blackburn (1998: 76) has come closest when suggesting a disjunctive analysis of a 
claim such as ‘What Johnny said this morning was true’. I will build on and expand this disjunctive 
analysis when examining the more general thesis ‘There are moral truths’. 
4 It might be argued that metaphysical moral realists could respond that their endorsement of 
(T) amounts to both a metaphysical and a moral position (Berker 2017: 771). Nonetheless, if there 
is to be a meaningful contrast between relaxed and metaphysical moral realism, and if metaphys-
ical realists now hold that (T) is both moral and metaphysical, they will still have to make explicit 
in which way this metaphysical interpretation adds to or differs from relaxed realists’ moral inter-
pretation. 
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At first sight, providing a semantics for (T) which supports (T)’s moral classification 
does not seem too difficult a task. After all, relaxed realists are generally also minimalists 
about truth,5 and thus hold that there is no more to understanding the concept of truth 
than to grasp that 
(T*)  It is true that snooping is wrong 
and asserting 
(M)  Snooping is wrong 
are conceptually equivalent,6 in that whenever we can assert (T*), we can also assert (M) 
and vice versa. To the thesis that there is no substantive difference between (T*) and (M), 
add the information that (M) is moral and we arrive at the result that (T*) too is most 
plausibly understood as a moral claim—just as relaxed realists intend. As Blackburn 
(1998: 78, 296) appositely puts it, minimalism thus allows us to add as many addenda to 
a claim such as (M) as we like—that (M) is true, that it states fact, that (M) really and truly 
represents reality, etc.—and yet never leave the moral ground from where we started, 
namely: (M).  
Given this fast-track, minimalism-based path to (T*)’s moral classification, we might 
expect minimalism to provide the same kind of straightforward support to relaxed real-
ists’ moral interpretation of (T): 
(T)  There are moral truths. 
For instance, Kramer (2017: 206-207) appears to do so when declaring that “[o]f central 
importance to [relaxed moral realism] … is its minimalist account of truth and reality and 
facts and properties. Precisely because those notions and cognate notions are all to be 
construed minimalistically, debates over the existence or nature or objectivity of moral 
principles and properties are substantive ethical debates.”7 However, things are not that 
simple. Two reasons explain why.  
Firstly, in contrast to (T*), (T) does not state which specific proposition is true and 
thus falls into the context of indirect, rather than direct truth-ascriptions.8 Indirect truth-
ascriptions are, in turn, to be understood on grounds of the logical function that the 
truth-predicate plays in our language, which is to make possible semantic ascent by al-
lowing us to generalise over and indirectly refer to other claims. Given as much, mini-
malists will tell us that the thesis ‘There are moral truths’ is no more than a different 
                                                             
5 As far as I am aware, all relaxed realists adopt minimalism about truth in some shape or 
form. For instance, see Blackburn (1998: 78), Price (2013: 55), Scanlon (2014: 43), Parfit (2011: 
756, n. 295), Kramer (2009: 261) and, more hesitantly, Dworkin (2011: 173). For more on mini-
malism, see Horwich (1998) and Soames (2003). 
6 I loosely follow Soames (2003: 372, 382, fn. 4) here, who explains that the propositions ‘It 
is true that p’ and ‘p’ are conceptually equivalent, meaning that they “are trivial, necessary and 
apriori consequences of one another” in that “there is a way of apprehending the proposition 
that p is true … such that when the proposition that p is true is apprehended in this way, the 
agent is able, apriori, to infer p.” 
7 Tellingly, the examples Kramer lists in support of this statement all fall into direct truth-
contexts such as (T*), not indirect truth-contexts such as (T) in which I am interested here. 
8 For the difference between direct and indirect truth-contexts, see Soames (1997: 3). 
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formulation of the claim ‘At least one moral claim is true’ which, in turn, can be taken as 
equivalent to an infinite disjunction comprising only moral disjuncts, such as: 
(D1) Snooping is wrong or snooping is not wrong, or  
Betraying someone’s confidence is permissible or betraying someone’s confi-
dence is not permissible, or  
Caring for others is right or caring for others is not right, or 
… 
Since it is moral claims that can make (T) true, (T) must generalise over all claims pm that 
qualify as moral. And since two relaxed moral realists can agree that moral truths exist 
whilst disagreeing about which moral truths these are, (T) must be analysed disjunctively. 
(D1) captures both these insights. 
Analysing (T) in terms of (D1), then, has great prima facie plausibility. At the same 
time, it remains obscure in which way (D1) is to classify as moral. After all, (D1) appears 
to be nothing more than a collection of instances of the law of the excluded middle (pm 
˅ ¬pm), and thus a logical rather than a moral truth.9 And since (D1) is supposed to be 
equivalent with (T), the same holds for (T). Consequently, in contrast to 
                                                             
9 I should address two worries at this point. Firstly, could a truth such as (pm ˅ ¬pm) not be 
both logical and internal to moral discourse? Yes, and nothing I will say here will deny this. 
Nonetheless, even if it were agreed that (pm ˅ ¬pm) is both logical and discourse-internal, we can 
and should still ask on which grounds (pm ˅ ¬pm) can indeed be classified as a discourse-internal 
truth. As I explain in §2.1, I interpret this question as asking in which way (pm ˅ ¬pm) can be 
supported on the basis of moral considerations and provide an answer by presenting two moral 
arguments to this effect. There, we will also see that although (pm ˅ ¬pm) is usually categorised as 
a logical truth, it is not trivial in the same sense as (pm ® pm) might be. Rather, I will argue that 
since it is not trivial whether or not moral claims are determinately true, it is not trivial either 
whether or not (pm ˅ ¬pm) holds within the moral domain. 
Secondly, as stated in footnote 2, I am primarily interested in moral realists’ thesis that there 
are moral truths, rather than their thesis that these truths are objective and mind-independent. 
However, it might be argued that if we merged both these theses into the claim (TM) ‘There are 
mind-independent moral truths’, worries about its logical classification would no longer arise, as 
(TM) might now be analysed along the lines of disjunctions such as (DM) ‘Either it is objectively 
the case that snooping is wrong, or it is objectively the case that snooping is not wrong’. (DM), 
though, is not an instance of the law of the excluded middle; indeed, constructivists might want 
to reject both its disjuncts. Accordingly, it might be thought that by shifting focus from (T) to 
(TM), my challenge to relaxed realism collapses. My response to this suggestion is twofold. Firstly, 
even if this analysis of (TM) were correct, asking in which way the more general thesis (T) ‘There 
are moral truths’ can be seen as discourse-internal becomes no less significant for relaxed realists. 
Rather, as set out in footnote 2, since relaxed realists are committed to (T)’s moral interpretation, 
showing (T) to be discourse-internal remains one objective that they must achieve in order for 
their project to be successful. Secondly, it is not clear that (DM) is the correct analysis of (TM). 
Rather, it could be suggested that (TM) must be understood along the lines of (DM*) ‘Either, it is 
the case that snooping is wrong and that snooping’s being wrong is mind-independent, or it is 
not the case that snooping is wrong and that snooping’s being wrong is mind-independent’. Ad-
mittedly, this analysis of (DM*) is more complicated than (D1)’s. Still it is an instance of the law 
of the excluded middle, the negative disjunct of which would be endorsed both by error-theoretic 
irrealists and constructivists, albeit for different reasons. Accordingly, if (DM*) were the correct 
analysis of (TM), moving from (T) to (TM) would still require us to ask in which way (DM*) can 
be seen as moral. Given my interest in moral realism’s opposition to error-theoretic irrealism, 
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(T*)  It is true that snooping is wrong, 
it is by no means clear in which way 
(T)  There are moral truths 
qualifies as a moral, discourse-internal claim, as relaxed realists have us believe. 
The second reason why (T)’s moral categorisation is not as straightforward as (T*)’s 
is that minimalism supports the moral classification of claims only when combined with 
an independent criterion that secures the moral categorisation of the claims which are 
called true. This is why I said earlier that (T*)’s conceptual equivalence with 
(M)  Snooping is wrong 
supports (T*)’s moral classification when supplemented with the information that (M) is 
moral. Now, (M)’s moral classification is a clear-cut case. (D1)’s classification and, as we 
will see, that of other claims is not. Hence, although Kramer is absolutely right in em-
phasising minimalism’s importance for relaxed realism, minimalism by no means settles 
all questions in relaxed realists’ favour. 
Accordingly, much more needs to be said before we can arrive at a minimalism-
friendly, relaxed semantic analysis of (T) that shows (T) to be moral. As I will suggest in 
the next section, three such analyses are conceivable. However, as I will also argue, none 
of them takes relaxed realists to where they want to be: Whilst the first no longer draws 
the correct demarcation line between realism and error-theoretic irrealism (§2.1), the sec-
ond is incompatible with relaxed realists’ commitments about moral discourse and thus 
unavailable to them (§2.2). And whereas the third is indeed compatible with relaxed real-
ism, it must be rejected on independent grounds since it relies on unsustainable semantic 
assumptions about moral concepts (§2.3).   
As I will suggest in §3, though, the conclusion to be drawn from this negative result 
is not to give up relaxed realism. Rather, it is to modify our understanding of what this 
relaxed position and its opposition to irrealism involves. Accordingly, enquiring into the 
moral classification of (T) forces us not only to explicate relaxed realism’s semantic com-
mitments, but also to recalibrate its opposition to irrealism. 
Before I start, though, let me briefly address a worry you may have about my focus 
on (T)’s semantic analysis. That is, it might be thought that even if I were right about the 
unexpected difficulties that a minimalism-friendly semantics of  
(T)  There are moral truths 
encounters, relaxed realists need not be overly concerned by this finding as long as they 
can simply blank out (T) and instead focus exclusively on specific moral truth-ascriptions 
such as 
(T*)  It is true that snooping is wrong. 
Since, as I have indicated above, relaxed realists’ path to (T*)’s moral categorisation is 
straightforward, shifting focus from (T) to (T*) would secure the moral categorisation of 
their view without having to become entangled in any hitches surrounding (T). 
                                                             
though, I will keep concentrating on (T) and (D1) rather than on (TM) and (DM*). I am grateful 
to an anonymous referee from Ergo for pressing me on both worries. 
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Yet, this shift from (T) to (T*) will not do. For, although endorsing a specific truth-
ascription such as (T*) is sufficient to qualify as a relaxed realist, it is not necessary. After 
all, whilst Anna, a relaxed realist, might hold that snooping is wrong, Bella, also a relaxed 
realist, might think that doing so is not wrong and instead believe that it is permissible. 
Indeed, Charlotte might even be a relaxed realist without endorsing any specific moral 
truth-ascription such as (T*), since although she is sure that some moral claim is true, she 
does not know which one this is. To understand what makes all three of them relaxed 
realists, then, we need to know which claim it is that Anna, Bella and Charlotte equally 
endorse despite their disagreement on specific truth-ascriptions such as (T*). Of course, we 
might rightly respond at this point that all three are clearly committed to holding some 
moral claim to be true, no matter which one this is. It is just as clear, though, that by 
giving this response, we have simply arrived back at their commitment to (T)! Accord-
ingly, in order to understand what is involved in being a relaxed realist and how relaxed 
realism is itself a moral position, there is no way around providing a semantics of (T) 
which shows (T) to be moral. Let us examine next, then, what such a semantics could 
look like. 
2 The Troubles Surrounding (T) 
Our first stab at a minimalism-friendly semantics of (T) took (T) to be equivalent with 
(D1) which, in turn, looked just like a collection of instances of the law of the excluded 
middle, and thus a logical rather than a moral truth.10 Hence, for a relaxed realist to resist 
this result, she must be able to show that (T) is discourse-internal and do so in a way that 
is compatible with her relaxed realism. There are two ways of establishing as much. 
Firstly, she can focus exclusively on (T) analysed along the lines of (D1) and show that 
(D1) does, after all, qualify as a moral truth. I will examine this approach in §2.1. Alter-
natively, she can attempt to modify (T)’s analysis in such a way that it no longer features 
instances of the law of the excluded middle (pm ˅ ¬pm) as contained by (D1), and instead 
show (T) to be equivalent with a disjunction of the form (pm ˅ qm ˅ rm ˅ …), where pm, 
qm, rm etc. are moral claims. The general thought behind this strategy, then, is to argue 
that just as (T*) must count as moral because it is conceptually equivalent with a specific 
moral claim, (T) must qualify as moral because it is conceptually equivalent with an infi-
nite disjunction of moral claims. The suggestions discussed in §2.2 and §2.3 follow this 
second path. 
2.1 (D1) as a Moral Truth 
Let us consider, then, in which way (T) analysed along the lines of (D1), and thus dis-
junctions of the form (pm ˅ ¬pm), could be shown to be moral.11 In doing so, we first 
                                                             
10 As many readers will have noticed, this problem is the mirror image of the inconsistency 
challenge faced by moral error theorists: If negations of moral claims are themselves moral, moral 
error theorists cannot consistently endorse the truth of these negations and simultaneously hold 
all moral claims to be false. Hence, the same argument that accuses moral error theories of in-
consistency can be used to accuse relaxed realism of stating a logical truth. Recent discussions of 
the inconsistency challenge thus also strongly inform the moves discussed in this section (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2006: 32-37; Pigden 2007: 450-455; Olson 2014: 11-15; Streumer 2017: §54). 
11 You might have spotted a problem with regard to (T)’s analysis in terms of (D1), namely: 
error-theoretic irrealists can endorse (D1) by accepting its negated disjuncts. This worrying 
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need to take a step back and make explicit what has so far remained implicit, namely: 
What would have to be the case for (D1) to qualify as moral? More generally: What is it 
that grounds the moral classification of a claim p?  
Here is one idea: p counts as moral iff it uses (rather than mentions) moral vocabu-
lary. Let us call this the ‘use criterion’. This criterion sounds prima facie plausible—after 
all, all paradigmatically moral claims, such as ‘Snooping is wrong’, ‘Helping others is fair’, 
etc. fulfil it. Still, it will not do for our purposes, as using moral terms is neither necessary 
nor, arguably, sufficient for moral categorisation. It is not necessary because there are 
claims that we would want to categorise as moral although they do not use moral vocab-
ulary. For instance, the claim ‘Everything you said is true’ does not use moral terms but 
should be classified as moral if what you said included only paradigmatically moral claims. 
Using moral terms is, in turn, not sufficient for moral categorisation since there are claims 
whose moral categorisation is contested even though they do feature moral vocabulary. 
‘Snooping is wrong and snooping is not wrong’ is one example of a claim that falls into 
this contested category; crucially, the disjunctions featuring in (D1), such as ‘Snooping is 
wrong or snooping is not wrong’, are further examples. The ‘use criterion’, then, is far 
too coarse-grained to help settle controversies about moral categorisation. 
Here, then, is another proposal: Following Streumer (2017: 2-4) and Olson (2014: 
15), relaxed realists could declare that p counts as moral iff it conceptually entails that 
some moral predicate is satisfied. Let us call this the ‘conceptual criterion’. Again, this 
criterion has great prima facie plausibility, as all paradigmatically moral claims do entail 
satisfaction of some moral predicate. At the same time, by demanding conceptual entail-
ment relations, this criterion sets the bar very high for moral classification. Indeed, for 
the purposes of relaxed realists, it sets it too high. For, at least at first sight, (D1) does not 
clear it: Since (D1) contains negated disjuncts, it does not entail that some moral predicate 
is satisfied and thus will not qualify as moral according to the conceptual criterion. Now, 
it might be thought that closer inspection could overturn this result, namely by showing 
that a negated disjunct such as ‘Snooping is not wrong’ does conceptually entail a non-
negated claim such as ‘Snooping is permissible’, in which case the conceptual criterion 
would, after all, be fulfilled. Yet, as I explain in §2.3, there are good reasons to believe 
that no such conceptual entailment relations between negated and non-negated moral 
claims obtain. Accordingly, the conceptual criterion will not do for relaxed realists either.  
Instead, I believe that relaxed realists should adopt a criterion along the following 
lines: A claim p counts as moral iff we find out about p’s truth or falsity by engaging in 
moral reasoning.12 As such, the claim ‘Killing is wrong’ qualifies as moral because we can 
                                                             
observation is correct and I will return to it at the end of this section. Over the next few pages, 
though, I will bracket this worry to focus exclusively on (D1)’s discourse-internal classification. 
Two reasons explain why. Firstly, examining in which way (D1) could qualify as moral forces us 
not only to sharpen our understanding of the relation between moral discourse and the applica-
tion of the law of the excluded middle, but also to explicate the criterion that relaxed realists 
could employ in order to classify claims as moral. This, in turn, will prove essential for later 
examinations of the relaxed/metaphysical debate and thus our understanding of how and on 
which levels relaxed realism can be opposed. Secondly, no matter how (T) is analysed, relaxed 
realists are committed to (D1)’s moral interpretation. Accordingly, if (D1) could not be shown to 
be moral, relaxed realists would be in trouble irrespective of our analysis of (T). The significance 
of establishing (D1)’s moral categorisation, then, reaches beyond the more limited focus of this 
paper. 
12 This first formulation no doubt needs to be further specified. For the purposes of this 
paper, though, it will do to stick with this rough version. Does this criterion require that p’s truth 
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discover whether or not killing is indeed wrong only by considering moral arguments for 
and against killing. In contrast, the claim ‘A 250,000 volts shock will kill you’ is not moral 
because it must be assessed as true or false by employing empirical methods, not by moral 
reasoning. Since this criterion thus pertains to the methods we employ in order to deter-
mine truth-values, let us call it the ‘methodological criterion’.  
In contrast to the use criterion, which does not help us settle contested cases, and 
contrary to the conceptual criterion, which does not support (D1)’s moral categorisation, 
the methodological criterion might give relaxed realists exactly what they need. For, as 
long as relaxed realists can successfully make the case that the truth of (D1), and thus of 
disjunctions of the form (pm ˅ ¬pm), must be established on the basis of moral arguments, 
this criterion will classify (D1) as a moral truth. At least two such arguments are conceiv-
able. 
In a nutshell (and somewhat misleadingly), the first runs as follows: It would be 
morally good if (pm ˅ ¬pm); therefore, (pm ˅ ¬pm). Why it would be morally good if (pm ˅ 
¬pm) is not that hard to see: It is part of our moral lives that we constantly find ourselves 
confronted with moral decisions. We are torn between refraining from snooping around 
in a friend’s diary and risking serious harm, between taking up a fulfilling job and looking 
after one’s family, between having a disabled child and aborting it, etc. Being desperate 
to do what is right, we urgently need to know how we ought to act. Yet, if there were no 
answers to these questions—for instance, if ‘Snooping is wrong or it is not wrong’ did 
not hold—we could expect no moral guidance within our lives and would, therefore, be 
left all alone with the moral conflicts we face. Clearly, this would not be a desirable situ-
ation. Hence, it would be morally good if there were determinate answers to moral ques-
tions—that is, it would be good if (pm ˅ ¬pm) were true.13 Consequently, (pm ˅ ¬pm) is 
true, or so this argument concludes. Let us call this the ‘desirability argument’. 
Phrased thus, the desirability argument obviously smacks of wishful thinking. After 
all, the observation that it would be morally good or desirable if some fact obtained does 
not generally entail that this fact obtains. Interestingly, though, this charge of wishful 
thinking might miss the mark if the fact which is judged to be morally good is itself 
moral.14 To elaborate, assume that there are two moral theories, A and B, both of which 
could, in principle, be true. However, whereas A assigns determinate truth-values to most 
moral claims, B entails that hardly any moral questions have determinate answers. Hence, 
provided that it would indeed be morally good if (pm ˅ ¬pm) were true, it would also be 
morally good if A, and not B, were true. Now, given that A is morally better than B, could 
it still be the case that A is nevertheless false and B is true? It is hard to see how this 
could be so. For, morality itself now provides a moral reason for A and against B, whilst 
morality would never speak for a moral theory that entails false moral verdicts and pro-
vides wrong moral advice. Accordingly, if this is right, there is an important moral constraint 
on moral theories, such that a moral theory cannot be true if there is another moral theory 
which is morally better. Consequently, if any of the theories A and B is to be true at all, 
it must be A, and not B. Generalising this result, we can thus see that what seemed like a 
mere case of wishful thinking turns out to be an indirect moral argument for (D1): Since 
only those moral theories pass the moral desirability constraint which entail that (most) 
                                                             
can be determined on moral grounds, or that it must be so determined? I return to this question 
below. 
13 Kramer (2009: 94) can be read as endorsing some such argument when declaring that moral 
“indeterminacy would be profoundly problematic morally if it obtained on a large scale”. 
14 For further discussion, see Enoch (2009), Preston-Roedder (2014) and Sayre-McCord (Ms.), 
who I follow most closely here. 
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moral claims have determinate truth-values, no matter which one of these is true, it will 
entail that (pm ˅ ¬pm) (at least for most pm). Given this moral argument for (D1), then, 
the methodological criterion will classify (D1) as moral. 
The second moral argument for (D1) pursues the following route: Assume that the 
best method for finding out which moral claims and theories are true were one of reflec-
tive equilibrium, according to which our belief in the truth of moral claims and theories 
is justified only if these claims and theories cohere with well-considered moral judge-
ments. Which judgements are well-considered and how to derive general moral theories 
from these judgements are once more moral questions, which require us to engage in 
substantive moral reasoning about what is good, just, impermissible or virtuous, say. As-
sume further that this process led in equally morally sound ways to two different reflective 
equilibria containing two different moral theories, C and D, where C and D reach con-
flicting results on moral questions such that whenever C judges a moral claim pm to be 
true, D judges pm to be false, and vice versa. What are we to make of this case? Given that 
there are two equally justified moral theories coming to contradictory moral verdicts, one 
plausible reaction would be to declare that we have no reason to believe that there are 
determinate answers to moral questions: In other words, we have no reason to believe 
that (pm ˅ ¬pm) is true.15 
In contrast, assume that this reflective process did not lead to different equilibria 
which are morally on a par. Instead, there is only one, morally superior reflective equilib-
rium which provides moral reason to believe in the truth of a specific moral theory, E. 
Assume further that E is such that it provides a moral standard which generates deter-
minate answers to moral questions. In this scenario, our belief in the truth of E, and thus 
also the truth of (pm ˅ ¬pm), would be justified.  
Importantly, though, no matter whether we argue for or against (pm ˅ ¬pm), our case 
crucially proceeds from within moral discourse: We need to take a moral stance on how 
plausible certain moral intuitions are, how to resolve conflicts between moral judgements, 
if there is one, and only one, reflective equilibrium that is best supported by moral rea-
sons, etc. Consequently, the methodological criterion will once more classify (pm ˅ ¬pm) 
and thus (D1) as moral. Let us call this the ‘equilibrium argument’. 
Both the desirability argument and the equilibrium argument doubtless require fur-
ther explication. Still, they give us a good idea of how relaxed realists can back up the 
moral categorisation of (D1) on the basis of the methodological criterion by providing 
moral arguments for (D1)’s truth. If successful, this would not detract from the fact that 
(D1) amounts to a collection of instances of the law of the excluded middle. However, it 
would entail that whether or not (pm ˅ ¬pm) holds within moral discourse in the first place 
is a moral question. 
Can (D1)’s truth be established only by moral reasoning, or are there other paths 
available to find out whether or not (pm ˅ ¬pm) holds within the moral domain? I will 
return to this question in §3, where it will prove important for our understanding of 
possible ways to reject relaxed realism’s moral interpretation of morality’s objectivity. For 
now, though, assume that we have reached a point where we understand in which way 
relaxed realists can support the moral categorisation of (D1) and thus (T). Does this as-
suage all our concerns?  
                                                             
15 See Scanlon’s (2014: ch. 4, 80; 2017: 878) further ideas on this strategy and conclusion. 
Kramer’s (2009: 102) thoughts on evenly balanced reasons for and against some action can also 
be read along these lines. 
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No. For, even though we now know in which way (D1) can be regarded as moral, it 
is not clear in which way endorsement of (D1) can help us distinguish between relaxed 
realism and error-theoretic irrealism. After all, (D1) can also be accepted by someone 
who endorses its negated disjuncts whilst rejecting all of its non-negated disjuncts, hold-
ing that snooping is not wrong, and not permissible, and not right, and not fair, and 
not… However, we would not normally regard such a person as a moral realist. Accord-
ingly, even though we have now achieved the important interim objective of understand-
ing on which grounds (D1) can be categorised as moral and how application of the law 
of the excluded middle relates to moral discourse, analysing (T) in terms of (D1) makes 
us lose our grip on what distinguishes relaxed realism from error-theoretic irrealism.  
How, then, could we proceed from this point? One way would be to conclude that 
if acceptance of (T):  
(T)  There are moral truths 
analysed along the lines of (D1) fails to draw the demarcation line between relaxed realism 
and irrealism in the right place, we need to look at a claim other than (T) which can 
successfully discharge this task whilst still being moral. I will consider this approach in 
§3. Alternatively, we could stick to (T), yet try to revise its semantic analysis such that 
accepting (T) can, after all, delineate relaxed realism and irrealism correctly. More pre-
cisely, if it were possible to modify (T)’s analysis in such a way that it no longer featured 
any of the negations which irrealists are happy to accept, (T) could still turn out to be 
both discourse-internal and capable of successfully distinguishing between realism and 
irrealism. Before turning away from it, we should thus give (T) another chance. Hence, 
let us look next at two ways in which (T)’s analysis could be revised. 
2.2 Limiting the Set of Moral Claims 
The first way to modify our analysis of (T) in such a way that it no longer contains any 
negations harks back to the observation that (T) must generalise over all claims that could 
make (T) true. In the case of (T), these are thus all moral claims. Consequently, which 
disjunction is equivalent with (T) depends on which claims count as moral. By including 
both moral claims and their negations, (D1) presupposes that both ‘pm’ and ‘¬pm’ fall into 
this moral class. Hence, if our minimalism-based semantics of (T) is no longer to feature 
any negations, we could try to limit this set of moral claims in such a way that it no longer 
contains any negated moral claims. That is, although we would continue to categorise the 
claim ‘pm’ as moral, we would now argue that its negation ‘¬pm’ is not.16 If so, (T) would 
no longer be equivalent with (D1), but with a disjunction along the lines of (D2): 
(D2) Snooping is wrong, or  
Betraying someone’s confidence is permissible, or  
Caring for others is right, or 
…  
                                                             
16 As has recently been argued by moral error theorists Streumer (2017: §54) and Olson (2014: 
14). Classifying negated moral claims as non-moral allows error theorists to endorse the truth of 
non-moral negations and simultaneously hold that no moral claim is ever true without running 
into inconsistency. 
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(D2) appears to tick all the right boxes: (D2) is certainly a claim which relaxed realists 
would want to endorse and irrealists would want to reject, which means that in contrast 
to (D1), acceptance of (D2) can help us to distinguish between moral realism and irreal-
ism. By being disjunctive, it accounts for the possibility that relaxed realists can agree on 
(T), yet disagree about which specific moral claim to accept. Since (D2) consists exclu-
sively of first-order moral disjuncts, it is itself most plausibly categorised as moral. And 
since (T) is now taken to be equivalent to (D2), so is (T)—just as relaxed realists intend. 
Note that if (D2) were the right analysis of (T), (T)’s semantic analysis would thus 
provide relaxed realists with a very strong case for (T)’s moral categorisation: Since (T) 
would be conceptually equivalent with (D2), and since (D2) exclusively contains disjuncts 
which literally everyone holds to be moral, it would be very hard indeed to resist (T)’s 
moral categorisation.  
However, whilst this manoeuvre of excluding negations from the class of moral 
claims does indeed achieve the desired moral categorisation of (T) and successfully dis-
tinguishes between relaxed realism and irrealism, there is one box which (D2) does not 
tick: It is not available to the relaxed realist. To see why, remember that relaxed realists 
maintain that claims about the existence and non-existence of moral truths are not to be 
read as non-moral, metaphysical theses about morality, but as moral claims which are put 
forward from within moral discourse. Declaring that no negated moral claim ‘¬pm’ and 
no truth-ascription ‘It is true that ¬pm’ are ever moral, would thus be antithetical to the 
relaxed approach. However, it is exactly this non-moral categorisation of negations on 
which analysing (T) in terms of (D2) is based. Consequently, this modified analysis of (T) 
is incompatible with the relaxed approach to moral truths: Instead of eliminating nega-
tions from the minimalist analysis of (T) by seeking to categorise these as non-moral, 
relaxed moral realists have an overwhelming interest in resisting this non-moral classifica-
tion and claiming instead that negated moral claims and their corresponding truth-ascrip-
tions are, or at least can be, moral.17 Analysing (T) in terms of (D2), then, is a non-starter 
for relaxed realists. 
2.3 Conceptual Entailment 
The second way to establish that (T) is both discourse-internal and capable of distin-
guishing between relaxed realism and irrealism is more promising. This does not seek to 
eliminate negations from our analysis of (T) by excluding them from the set of claims 
which can make (T) true, but instead aims to replace them with non-negated moral claims 
by arguing that the former conceptually entail the latter. 
To elaborate, return to our original analysis of (T) in terms of (D1), and thus dis-
junctions of the form ‘Snooping is wrong or snooping is not wrong’. Next, assume that 
the predicate ‘is not wrong’ meant the same as the predicate ‘permissible’, say, so that the 
claim ‘Snooping is not wrong’ conceptually entailed that snooping is permissible. Pro-
vided that there are numerous such conceptual entailment relations—between ‘not 
wrong’ and ‘permissible’, ‘not permissible’ and ‘impermissible’, ‘not right’ and ‘wrong’, 
etc.—(D1) would be meaning-equivalent with (D3):18 
                                                             
17 The methodological criterion indicates how: All that relaxed realists have to show in order 
to secure the moral categorisation of negations is that their truth is established on moral grounds. 
Note, though, that relaxed realists need not deny that non-moral, metaphysical readings of truth-
ascriptions are intelligible, but only that they are false. I return to this issue in §3. 
18 (D3) is logically equivalent with (D2): Both are, in fact, disjunctions of non-negated moral 
claims. I distinguish here between (D2) and (D3) for purely illustrative purposes. 
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(D3) Snooping is wrong or it is permissible, or  
Betraying someone’s confidence is permissible or it is impermissible, or  
Caring for others is right or it is wrong, or 
… 
Once more, (D3) appears to deliver all the results that relaxed realists wish for: Relaxed 
realists will certainly want to endorse (D3) whilst error-theoretic irrealists will want to 
reject it, such that acceptance of (D3) successfully sets moral realists apart from irrealists. 
By being disjunctive, (D3) is just as compatible with moral disagreement amongst relaxed 
realists as are (D1) and (D2). And since (D3) consists exclusively of paradigmatically 
moral disjuncts, it is most plausibly regarded as moral itself. Hence, if (T) were concep-
tually equivalent with (D3) due to the conceptual entailment relations between negated 
and non-negated moral claims, relaxed realists would again be able to put forward an 
extremely strong case for (T)’s moral categorisation based on (T)’s semantic analysis. 
Importantly, in contrast to the suggestion discussed in §2.2, analysing (T) in terms 
of (D3) is compatible with relaxed realism: Since (D3) does not rely on problematic lim-
itations of the class of moral claims, it does not conflict with the relaxed approach to 
moral discourse. Accordingly, as a first interim result we can conclude that there is a 
semantic analysis of (T) available that shows (T) to be moral, is compatible with relaxed 
realism and correctly delineates relaxed realism from irrealism, as long as relaxed realists 
are also willing to defend the additional semantic thesis that moral terms such as ‘not 
wrong’ do indeed conceptually entail moral terms such as ‘permissible’. 
But do they? That is, should relaxed realists be willing to buy into this semantic thesis 
and build their case for the moral characterisation of moral realism on the claim that (D1) 
conceptually entails (D3)? Alas, I do not think so. To substantiate this response in full 
would, of course, require thorough semantic analysis, which cannot be provided here. 
What can be provided, though, are two considerations in its support.19 
Firstly, consider the claim ‘Iron’s being attracted to magnets is not wrong’. This ne-
gation does not conceptually entail that iron’s being so attracted is permissible—rather, 
iron’s magnetism is neither wrong nor permissible. If so, it must either be the case that, 
contrary to the conceptual entailment thesis, ‘not wrong’ does not conceptually entail ‘per-
missible’. Or we must be able to offer a semantic analysis for the occurrence of negated 
moral concepts such as ‘not wrong’ within the context of category mistakes that does not 
undermine the conceptual entailment from ‘not wrong’ to ‘permissible’ within claims that 
are not related to category mistakes. This, though, is not a promising endeavour. For, if 
the claims ‘Iron’s being attracted to magnets is not wrong’ and ‘Snooping is not wrong’ 
do not just mention, but also use the same negated term ‘not wrong’, and if both are true 
because the respective phenomena do not possess the moral property of wrongness (al-
beit for different reasons), how come that the latter allegedly conceptually (and not just 
morally!) entails that snooping is permissible, whereas the former does not conceptually 
entail the permissibility of iron’s magnetism?  
Secondly, consider the claim ‘Abortion is neither right nor wrong’, which does not 
pertain to the context of category mistakes. Note that even relaxed realists might want to 
                                                             
19 The considerations presented in the next paragraph are related to recent error-theoretic 
rejections of such conceptual entailment relations (Olson 2014; Streumer 2017; Pigden 2007) and 
thoughts about category mistakes developed in Kramer (2017). They also have benefitted greatly 
from discussions with Bart Streumer. Compare also Carston (1998) for metalinguistic analyses of 
contexts concerning category mistakes, and Thomason (1972) for interpretations of predicates as 
sortally restricted. 
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endorse this claim: After all, whilst they will certainly maintain that most moral claims have 
determinate truth-values, they need not necessarily defend the thesis that this holds for 
all moral claims.20 Rather, they could submit that whilst cases such as the wrongness of 
torturing children for fun are morally clear-cut, others—such as abortion, say—are such 
that the moral considerations speaking for and those speaking against abortion are evenly 
balanced, implying that abortion is neither right nor wrong. Whether or not such moral 
indeterminacy exists is certainly a subject of dispute amongst relaxed realists—for in-
stance, Kramer (2009) accepts it, whereas Dworkin (1996) does not. Note, though, that 
a position such as Kramer’s could not even be consistently formulated if ‘not right’ meant the 
same as ‘wrong’. Note also that particularly against the relaxed background, we should 
want to interpret any such disagreement about the existence of moral indeterminacy not 
as some conceptual dispute about the meaning of moral concepts, but as a moral exchange 
about whether or not moral considerations for and against some action can ever be evenly 
balanced. Accordingly, if we want to maintain that it is an open, coherent and substan-
tially moral question whether or not some actions might be neither right nor wrong, as I 
believe any relaxed realist should, negated moral claims such as ‘Snooping is not right’ 
cannot conceptually entail that some moral predicate such as ‘wrong’ is satisfied. But if 
no such conceptual entailment relations hold, (D3) is neither conceptually entailed by 
(D1), nor equivalent with (T).  
Accordingly, even though analysing (T) in terms of (D3) is compatible with relaxed 
realism and achieves the results relaxed realists desire, doing so comes at the price of 
buying into a semantic thesis about conceptual entailment relations between negated and 
non-negated moral claims which should be rejected both from a general and a specifically 
relaxed perspective. As a result, we are still no closer to a convincing relaxed semantics 
of (T) which would show (T) to be both discourse-internal and capable of successfully 
delineating relaxed realism from irrealism. 
Is there any other way to exclude negations from our analysis of (T) in order to 
establish that (T) is discourse-internal and that its acceptance succeeds in setting realists 
apart from irrealists? I cannot think of one. Consequently, we seem to have manoeuvred 
ourselves into a somewhat awkward corner: We started by saying that what unites relaxed 
realists qua realists is their endorsement of (T), in that they all hold some moral claim to 
be true, no matter which one this is. Yet, whilst the minimalism-based approach to (T) 
suggests analysing (T) in terms of (D1), I have argued in §2.1 that even if we can show 
(D1) to be discourse-internal, acceptance of (D1) cannot correctly distinguish relaxed 
realism from irrealism. At the same time, we have seen in §2.2 and §2.3 that attempts to 
remedy this result by analysing (T) along the lines of (D2) and (D3) are either not available 
to relaxed realists or not semantically plausible, which forces us back to (D1). What are 
we to make of this result, then? 
3 Modifying Relaxed Realism 
One way for us to react would be to abandon relaxed realism altogether. That is, we could 
argue that since (T): 
                                                             
20 See Kramer (2009: 94, 102) and Devitt’s (1991: 22) remark from a different context: “Real-
ism … requires that there be tokens that are determinately of one of those types. It does not 
require that each token be determinately of one of those types.” Boyd (1989) also denies that 
realism implies bivalence. 
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(T)  There are moral truths 
cannot be shown to be both moral and capable of demarcating relaxed realism from 
irrealism on the basis of a convincing semantic analysis that would be compatible with 
relaxed commitments, relaxed realists are wrong in proclaiming that moral realism is itself 
a moral position. This very radical conclusion, though, would be premature. Instead, it is 
much more reasonable to suggest that if (T) cannot do the trick for relaxed realism, we 
should shift focus and look for a claim other than (T) which can be used to differentiate 
between realism and irrealism whilst still being moral. That is, contrary to all the quotes 
listed on the first page of this paper, we should modify our understanding of what dis-
tinguishes relaxed realism from irrealism by arguing that relaxed realism should not be 
characterised by its acceptance of (T) and thus the sweeping thesis that there are moral 
truths, but by the more restricted claim:21 
(T+)  There are positive moral truths, 
where a moral claim qualifies as ‘positive’ if it does not feature a single widest-scope 
negation. As such, the claim ‘Snooping is wrong’ qualifies as a positive moral claim, and—
if true—as a positive moral truth. The claim ‘It is not the case that snooping is wrong’, 
in turn, contains a widest-scope negation and thus does not count as a positive moral 
claim. Hence, since in contrast to (T), (T+) itself restricts the class of possible witnesses 
such that negations do not fall into this class, negations cannot feature in the right analysis 
of (T+). Contrary to (T), then, (T+) is indeed conceptually equivalent with a disjunction 
such as (D2) or (D3).22 And since we have already said that (D2) and (D3) are both to be 
classified as moral and able to delineate relaxed realism from irrealism, so is (T+). Ac-
cordingly, by re-conceiving of relaxed realism as being (partly) defined by its defence of 
(T+) rather than (T), moral realism not only retains its opposition to irrealism, but also 
comes out as a moral position—just as relaxed moral realists intend.  
As a further result, then, we can conclude that there is an understanding of relaxed 
realism available for which we can provide a minimalism-friendly semantics that ticks all 
the right boxes, is compatible with relaxed commitments and does not require relaxed 
realists to buy into any problematic semantic theses, as long as relaxed realists are also 
happy to shift focus from (T) to (T+).  
Should they be happy to do so? Yes. (T+) not only captures a central element of any 
realist position but might, in fact, also make explicit what relaxed realists had in mind all 
along. Moreover, defining relaxed realism on the basis of its defence of (T+) rather than 
(T) in no way affects relaxed realists’ stance towards (T), as they will continue to endorse 
not only (T), but also its moral categorisation as defended in §2.1. The only difference, 
then, is that their endorsement of (T) no longer explains what distinguishes relaxed real-
ists from irrealists—this role is now taken up by their acceptance of (T+).  
 How, then, do the considerations presented in this paper bear on relaxed realism’s 
dispute both with error-theoretic irrealism and substantively metaphysical interpretations 
of realism and irrealism? Put differently, what is involved in rejecting relaxed realism? 
What is involved in rejecting relaxed realism? 
                                                             
21 Again, this suggestion proceeds in direct parallel with the proposal to understand moral 
error theories not as proclaiming that all moral claims are false, but that all positive moral claims 
are false so as to secure their consistency. See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006: 35) for definitions of 
positive moral claims. 
22 As I have indicated in footnote 18, (D2) and (D3) are, after all, logically equivalent. 
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Starting with the rejection of relaxed realism, assume that the semantic analyses pro-
vided here were correct, such that when coupled with the methodological criterion, they 
entailed the moral categorisation of claims such as (T+), (T) and their respective nega-
tions. In this case, just as moral realism’s endorsement of (T+) and (T) would amount to 
defending moral positions, error-theoretic rejections of (T) and (T+) would also have to 
be understood as taking up positions within moral discourse—in Dworkin’s (1996, 2011) 
terminology, error-theoretic irrealism would now amount to a form of internal, not ex-
ternal scepticism. Accordingly, realists and irrealists would have to be regarded as partic-
ipants of the same moral game, which concerns the weighing of moral reasons for or 
against moral determinacy, moral objectivity, the existence of positive truths, or the pos-
sibility of moral knowledge, say. What distinguishes them from one another, in turn, 
would be the different moves that they make within this game, with realists endorsing (T) 
and (T+), and irrealists rejecting either (T)—by denying that any first-order moral claim 
is ever determinately true—or endorsing (T) but rejecting (T+)—by denying that any 
positive moral claim is ever true. Our analyses of (T) and (T+) thus provide the missing 
semantic foundations on which to build this moral interpretation of the realism/irrealism 
debate that has been favoured by relaxed realists for some time. 
What about the latter question about the rejection of relaxed realism? That is, do the 
semantic considerations presented here necessitate the moral interpretation of metaethi-
cal debate, or do they still leave room for metaphysical readings of (T+), (T) and their 
negations? 
Any such room will be limited with regard to (T+). After all, our semantic analysis 
of (T+) has shown (T+) to be equivalent with a disjunction of claims which literally 
everyone holds to be paradigmatically moral—no matter which categorisation criterion 
they may use to support this moral classification. Accordingly, rejecting (T+)’s moral 
categorisation is not plausible. This is why, I suppose, even an error theorist such as Bart 
Streumer (2017: 127) agrees that moral realism constitutes a moral position. And it is also 
why (T+)’s semantic analysis piles significant pressure on metaphysical moral realists, in 
that it forces them to explain in which way their defence of the moral claim (T+) is still 
supposed to amount a metaphysical position. 
At the same time, our semantic considerations show that relaxed realists’ own com-
mitments might well leave the door open for metaphysical interpretations of realism and 
irrealism alike. To elaborate, recall that when examining (D1)’s moral classification in 
§2.1, we specified that relaxed realists should adopt the methodological criterion, accord-
ing to which the specific categorisation of a claim p depends on the form of enquiry that 
needs to be employed in order to establish p’s truth or falsity. Hence, it was this criterion 
that enabled relaxed realists to secure the moral categorisation of a claim such as ‘There 
are moral truths’ even though this claim contains no moral terms, just as it was this cri-
terion that made it possible to categorise the claim (pm ˅ ¬pm) as moral although this 
disjunction does not guarantee that a moral predicate is satisfied. 
If this is relaxed realists’ moral categorisation criterion, though, metaphysically-
minded metaethicists can exploit it, too. For, just as the methodological criterion enables 
relaxed realists to declare that (T+), (T) and their negations are to be categorised as moral 
because we find out about their truth or falsity by moral reasoning, it enables metaphys-
ically-minded metaethicists to counter that (T+), (T) or their negations are not to be cat-
egorised (exclusively) as moral because their truth-values are not (solely) to be determined 
by moral reasoning. 
As such, metaphysical realists could pick up relaxed realists’ gauntlet by arguing that 
whilst it is true that (T+) amounts to a moral claim, it is also metaphysical because its 
16 
 
truth depends on certain metaphysical considerations in addition to moral arguments. 
Error-theoretic irrealists, in turn, will take up an even stronger position by holding that 
their denial of (T+) is based exclusively on non-moral arguments, and thus does not qualify 
as moral at all. Of course, when doing so, they need not deny that a claim such as ‘It is 
not the case that snooping is morally wrong’ can form the conclusion of a moral argu-
ment, for instance by explaining on the basis of some consequentialist moral theory that 
since snooping causes more good than harm, it is not wrong. However, they will insist 
that their own case for this negation contains only non-moral considerations, say by arguing 
on metasemantic grounds that the idea of a moral property is inconsistent, which entails 
that there are no moral properties which snooping—or any other action type—could 
possess. As a result, the methodological criterion will classify irrealists’ assertion that 
snooping is not wrong as non-moral. And since the same train of thought can be applied 
to the negation of (T+), the same will hold true of irrealists’ thesis that no positive moral 
claim is ever true. 
This, in turn, shows three important points about the dialectics of the relaxed/met-
aphysical debate. Firstly, it demonstrates that metaphysically-minded metaethicists can 
accept relaxed realists’ adoption of minimalism, their semantic analysis of (T+) and their 
preferred moral categorisation criterion, and yet maintain that their respective endorse-
ment and denial of (T+) do not (exclusively) amount to making a move within the moral 
game. Secondly, it shows that if we follow relaxed realists in adopting the methodological 
criterion, moral categorisations do not just ‘tumble out’ of semantic analyses, but also 
depend on epistemological contexts. This suggests, thirdly, that the debate between re-
laxed realists and metaphysically-minded metaethicists cannot be decided on purely se-
mantic grounds, or by minimalism about truth or hasty appeals to moral categorisation 
criteria. Rather, it must be settled by substantive arguments: It requires relaxed realists to 
argue either that metaphysical arguments for or against (T) and (T+) are not even intelli-
gible, or that despite being intelligible, these arguments are flawed and must be replaced 
by moral arguments.23 Similarly, it requires metaphysically-minded metaethicists to show 
in which way the arguments they present for or against (T) and (T+) really are metaphys-
ical arguments that go beyond the relaxed, moral case for them, and in which way these 
additional arguments are required to determine the truth of the claims under debate. 
Now, maybe relaxed realists have never expected semantic analyses of claims such 
as ‘There are moral truths’ or ‘No positive moral claim is ever true’ to settle the re-
laxed/metaphysical dispute in their favour by equipping them with an uncontroversial 
semantic argument against metaphysical metaethics which would render hard-fought, 
substantive debate superfluous. In any case, this paper has shown that they should not 
hope for any such argument. Rather, whilst the semantic considerations presented here 
have demonstrated how relaxed realists can indeed support their moral interpretation of 
metaethical debate, they must continue to defend this interpretation by presenting thor-
oughly worked-out, substantive arguments to the effect that only appeal to moral argu-
ments can convincingly settle whether or not claims such as (T) and (T+) are true.  
In recent years, relaxed realists have made a start on discharging this task. However, 
it is no more than that: a start. Hence, although we now know how to understand relaxed 
realism, which moral categorisation criterion and semantic analyses relaxed realists can 
employ in support of their view, and what a thorough defence of this relaxed position 
requires, a lot more work remains to be done before we can fully relax. 
                                                             
23 The former, more radical stance is what Dworkin (1996) appears to have in mind; the lat-
ter, more modest reading coheres better with Scanlon’s (2014) account, say. 
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